



Civil MRCC


Coordination and documentation platform for people in distress in the Central Mediterranean

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N°20

February
2026

ECHOES



From the Central
Mediterranean

Picture: CommemorAction in Grenoble, 6th of February 2026

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EVERY LIFE IS WORTH MORE THAN THEIR LAWS

On the 6th of February 2026, decentralized CommemorActions took place in over 60 cities across the Mediterranean sea. The gatherings collectively remembered the massacre which took place 12 years ago in Tarajal near Ceuta. Alongside relatives of the dead and missing at the borders, families and friends of victims of state and police violence within Europe joined this growing network of solidarity. The planned implementation of the racist CEAS pact and the brutalized externalization policies threaten to bring even more suffering and death in the near future.

This is why we must unite transnationally in the struggle for justice, equal rights, and freedom of movement, placing the testimonies and demands of relatives at the heart of our collective action!

Since the beginning of 2026:

- **1,671** people **arrived** in **Italy** and **Malta** by sea, many of whom arrived autonomously (UNHCR figures up to February 8).
- **244** people **were rescued** by the **civil fleet** from 8 boats in distress (CMRCC figure up to February 8).
- **781** people were **pushed back to Libya** after they were intercepted by the EU-supported so-called Libyan Coast Guard (IOM figure up to February 7).
- **56** people have been **reported dead or missing** on the Central Mediterranean Route (IOM figure up to February 7).

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

CRIMINALISING SOLIDARITY, RESISTING ABANDONMENT

Over the past three months, the central Mediterranean has once again exposed a stark conflict: on one side, people on the move fighting for their freedom of movement and civilian actors attempting to prevent deaths at sea; on the other, a growing architecture of legal pressure, administrative obstruction, and border externalisation that increasingly targets solidarity and the right to mobility.

Escalating Detentions of Civil Rescue Vessels Under the Piantadosi Decree

After rescuing 92 people, including 31 unaccompanied minors on the 3rd of November, the NGO vessel *Mediterranea* was accused by Italian authorities of violating the Piantadosi Decree for not immediately heading to the distant port of Livorno instead of disembarking in Porto Empedocle. The vessel invoked a formal declaration of a state of necessity, many survivors being traumatized and unfit for a four-day voyage in rough seas. While the captain argued that international maritime law allowed disembarkation at the nearest safe port, medical authorities and the Palermo Juvenile Court had deemed the rescued individuals unfit for several more days at sea and requested the minors' disembarkation. Italian authorities, however, stated that this action violated the Piantadosi Decree, highlighting a conflict between humanitarian obligations and national regulations, and on November 15, imposed 60 days of detention and a €10,000 fine on the vessel. *Mediterranea* was therefore the first ship of the Justice Fleet alliance getting detained.

Another rescue vessel, *Humanity 1*, was also detained in the Italian port of Ortona after disembarking 85 people on the 2nd of December, making it the second ship detained as part of the Justice Fleet. The detention order stated that the ship did not communicate with the Libyan Rescue Coordination Centre. SOS Humanity stated the crew acted in accordance with international maritime law and deliberately suspended communication with Libyan authorities because they considered the so-called Libyan Coast Guard illegitimate, a view supported by an Italian court in Catanzaro.

On December 3rd, 2025, the Court of Agrigento suspended the administrative detention of the NGO vessel *TROTAMAR III*, ruling that failure to notify Libyan authorities of rescue operations is not legally grounds for sanctions, fines, or detention. The court emphasized that penalties can only be applied for violations explicitly listed in law, and the omission to communicate with the Libyan Rescue Coordination Centre does not meet these criteria, especially given Libya's lack of credibility and unsafe conditions for rescued persons. This decision reinforces the legal protection of civil rescue vessels in the Central Mediterranean and highlights the illegality of applying the Piantadosi decree against humanitarian NGOs.

After rescuing 18 people in distress in international waters on 24 January 2026, the German rescue vessel *Sea-Watch 5* was detained by Italian authorities for 15 days and fined €7,500. Authorities justified the measure by alleging that the organization had refused to inform the so-called Libyan Coast Guard about the rescue operation. *Sea-Watch* counters that



these actors had previously attempted to intimidate the crew and ordered the ship to leave the area (an instruction the NGO argues has no basis under international law) and announced it would challenge the detention in court.

On February 13th, Italian authorities detained the rescue ship *Humanity 1* in the port of Trapani, Sicily, ordering it to remain there for 60 days and imposing a €10,000 fine after the vessel rescued 33 people in distress at sea. The following day, on 14 February 2026, SOS Humanity publicly condemned the measure, arguing that its crew had informed all relevant rescue coordination centres in line with international maritime law. Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi announced the detention on X, calling the crew's conduct "irresponsible" and claiming it put lives at risk, accusations the organization strongly rejects. In response, SOS Humanity issued a press release denouncing the decision as an obstruction to life-saving operations at a time when hundreds of people are reported missing in the Central Mediterranean.

Accountability in the Central Mediterranean


While ships are detained at ports, another struggle unfolds inside courtrooms. The criminal trial over the Cutro shipwreck has begun, with proceedings expected to examine responsibility for the deaths that occurred. The Cutro shipwreck refers to the tragic sinking of the wooden vessel *Summer Love* off Steccato di Cutro, Calabria on 26 February 2023, in which at least 94 migrants, including many children, died amid alleged delays in rescue response by Italian authorities. In response, six Italian officials from the Coast Guard and Guardia di Finanza were put on trial in early 2026 on charges including negligent shipwreck and multiple manslaughter, with 86 civil parties including survivors, families, and NGOs joining the case. Several SAR NGOs have acted as civil parties

to demand accountability and transparency for the failures in search and rescue efforts that contributed to one of the deadliest migrant tragedies in the Central Mediterranean.

At the same time, legal action connected to the Mare Jonio and Maersk Etienne cases continues, with a hearing in Ragusa on October 21, 2025. In this case, six activists are accused of "aggravated facilitation of illegal immigration" for their involvement in the 2020 rescue of 27 shipwreck survivors abandoned on the Danish tanker *Maersk Etienne* for 38 days before being transferred to the NGO vessel *Mare Jonio*. Prosecutors allege the rescue constituted illegal immigration and "profit motive" based on a later donation, but Mediterranea argues the action was a lawful humanitarian response when Malta and Denmark failed to assign a safe port. Mediterranea has stated its intention to turn accusations against solidarity into a broader reckoning over who allows people to die at sea.

On December 18, 2025, Maurizio Belpietro, former editor of *Panorama*, was convicted of defamation for calling humanitarian NGO workers "pirates" on the magazine's front page in November 2022. The Court of Milan ruled that he must pay €10,000 in provisional damages to Open Arms, EMERGENCY, Sea-Watch, SOS Mediterranee, Louise Michel, and Mediterranea, and €7,000 to AOI Rete Nazionale. The NGOs, which had joined the proceedings as civil parties, described the headline as false and offensive, emphasizing their lawful and life-saving operations in the Central Mediterranean. They welcomed the ruling as a vindication, stating it restores the truth, defends solidarity, and reinforces that humanitarian work cannot be criminalized or defamed.

Shipwreck remains by a beach in Cutro. Picture: Alarm Phone



A new MRCC in Benghazi, place-of-safety arrangements and list of safe countries: strengthening EU border externalisation

Beyond the courtroom, policy decisions continue to project migration control outward. Reports indicate that millions more euros continue to be directed toward cooperation with actors in Libya. The Italian government, with support from the European Commission, plans to establish a new maritime rescue coordination centre in Benghazi using EU funds, effectively extending existing structures and resources to eastern Libya. SAR NGOs criticise this initiative as supporting cooperation with armed groups accused of war crimes and using public funds to strengthen mechanisms that intercept and return people to detention and abuse, rather than saving lives at sea.

This approach fits within a broader strategy to strengthen migration partnerships, through which European states support migration management beyond their own territory via funding, training, and coordination frameworks. In a document leaked by Statewatch, the EU Presidency proposes “place-of-safety arrangements” as a way to reduce “irregular migration” and deaths at sea. Under this model, people rescued or intercepted at sea would be disembarked in non-EU third countries, where they would be temporarily received, screened, and potentially have their asylum claims processed or be returned, based on partnerships with those countries. It remains unclear if and when this proposal (which echoes the disembarkation platforms proposed by the European Commission in 2018) will be implemented.

On February 10th, the European Parliament also approved new asylum rules that establish an EU-wide list of “safe third countries” and “safe countries of origin,” allowing member states to fast-track asylum rejections and deportations based on those designations. Critics warn that this could undermine the individual right to seek asylum and expose vulnerable people to unsafe conditions in countries judged “safe” despite ongoing rights concerns. The official list of safe countries of origin includes Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, and Tunisia. These same countries are expected to feature in discussions around “safe third countries” in parts of the proposed rules, although an EU-wide safe third country list has not yet been finalised, and individual member states will still determine their own lists or apply the concept case-by-case. Ahead of the European Parliament vote on February 10th, a coalition of search and rescue and human rights organisations urged MEPs to

reject the EU-wide list of “safe countries of origin,” arguing that Tunisia for example does not meet the criteria.

People on the move Under Attack in Tunisia and Libya

In Tunisia, conditions for people on the move continue to deteriorate sharply. Reports from January and February 2026 document forced “voluntary” returns (VHR) coordinated by IOM, often under coercion, alongside repeated police raids on informal camps in cities like Sfax. Civil society organizations have documented tents and shelters being burned, leaving people on the move exposed to harsh winter conditions with no safe alternatives. These operations, framed as “migration management”, have created an atmosphere of fear and displacement, forcing people to live in constant precarity. In addition, many intercepted at sea continue to be forcibly deported to border areas, often in dangerous and isolated locations with no access to services and sometimes being sold to militias, a practice highlighted by various reports and a recent testimony collected by Alarm phone.

In Libya, the fragile social and political environment is increasingly tense, raising additional risks for migrants and displaced populations. The murder of the son of Muammar Gaddafi has sparked fears of social unrest, retaliatory violence, and localized conflicts, and potentially destabilizing regions where people on the move are already in a very precarious situation. Combined with ongoing EU-backed cooperation with armed actors and militia-controlled detention centers, these developments amplify the dangers faced by people on the move, including arbitrary detention, abuse, and exposure to armed clashes.

According to Alarm Phone’s analysis covering July-December 2025, people on the move continued to cross the Central Mediterranean despite facing violent attacks and pushbacks. Most departures originated from Libya, with rescue operations saving hundreds of boats under challenging conditions. The report also highlights the tragic human cost, estimating over 1,300 deaths, underscoring the persistent dangers of border violence. In January 2026, at least 380 migrants were officially listed as missing after eight boats departed from Sfax, Tunisia, during extreme weather caused by Cyclone Harry. An article published by Refugees in Libya, based on community testimonies suggest the true number could be far higher and possibly exceed 1,000.

Italy's New "Sicurezza" Decree: A Turning Point for Civil Liberties and Sea Rescue

On February 5, the new Italian "Sicurezza" decree-law, whose latest amendments follow the repression of last Saturday's demonstration in Turin, was approved by the Council of Ministers. Its provisions will adversely affect civil society as a whole and any form of protest action, in line with the previous decree.

A first set of measures allows for the preventive banning of certain vessels from entering Italian territorial waters. The duration of the ban, adopted by decision of the Council of Ministers and on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior, Piantedosi, would initially be 30 days but could extend up to six months. It could be justified by a terrorism threat or a health emergency, but also by an "exceptional migratory pressure," although this remains undefined.

In reality, this preventive and selective closure of territorial waters, readily bypassing international maritime law and the right to asylum in the name of national security, explicitly targets SAR NGOs. Meloni presents this flagship measure of her political program as a "selective naval blockade," following the security decrees of Salvini in 2018 and 2019, which initiated the "season of closed ports," that is, the refusal to assign Italian ports to rescue vessels requesting them. Indeed, these measures target sea rescue operations for people on the move, who are accused of being a "pull factor" for those disembarked on Italian territory.

From now on, it will no longer be the administrative authority that can prohibit entry, but the Council of Ministers through a political measure, and therefore one that is difficult to subject to judicial review, whereas courts often annulled administrative bans. Yet these vessels have no other European countries to turn to when seeking the assignment of a safe port after rescuing people in distress in the Central Mediterranean. What will become of the rescue at sea of the thousands of people who cross this deadly migration route?

A second measure provides for a limitation on judicial oversight in the validation of expulsion and detention decisions concerning foreign nationals, to avoid "interpretative distortions." This second measure effectively makes it more difficult for judges to rule on and potentially overturn measures adopted by the Ministry of the Interior, and follows the courageous decisions of judges in recent months that were seen as an obstacle to the government's ambitions. This provision also facilitates "faster and more effective

What's in the new Italian Immigration bill

Naval blockades and faster expulsions and so many more inhumane proposals to be presented to Parliament.



expulsions" of individuals considered dangerous by drastically reducing appeal deadlines and introducing a similar measure regarding their transfer to centers in Albania.

In recent months, several Italian judges have opposed the transfer of foreign nationals to Albanian centers on the grounds that there is no legal framework in place pending the adoption of the Pact. The government argued the opposite, claiming that European law already authorized such transfers to extraterritorial centers. Due to these legally conflicting interpretations of the texts in force, the Albanian centers have not been used for two years.

Moreover, this decree-law contains other particularly concerning repressive measures. Notably, it introduces the "preventive detention" of protesters who are arrested, as long as they are suspected "of posing a danger to the peaceful conduct of the demonstration and to public safety." Finally, Prime Minister Meloni has proposed suspending administrative investigations opened after the use of a weapon, resulting in serious injury or even the death of a citizen, by a police officer, thereby endorsing a presumption of self-defense.

Despite relentless attacks on humanitarian rescue, civil society has fought back, turning criminalization attempts into victories for solidarity and international law. Yet with a harsh new decree in Italy, increased border externalisation, and increased level of violence at sea and on land, the fight for solidarity with people on the move will have to continue stronger than ever!

Jeanne Tesson (Pilotes volontaires) and Sophie-Anne Bisiaux (Echoes team)

IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE!

A DIARY OF RESCUE COORDINATION BY CIVIL ACTORS IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN SEA

The following section provides an overview of the level and impact of rescue coordination by civil actors in the Central Mediterranean Sea, using brief reports and social media extracts.

NOVEMBER 2025

November 1 **Trottamar III** rescued 16 people from a rubber boat. Survivors were disembarked in Lampedusa.

November 2 **Mare Jonio** rescued 37 people who were on an overcrowded fiberglass vessel at risk of sinking in international waters in a Libyan-controlled SAR zone. They had been at sea for three days without drinking water or food. After this rescue, **Mare Jonio** rescued another 28 people from a rubber boat off the coast of Lampedusa. A third and final rescue occurred the following morning of 27 people from a fiberglass boat. Survivors of all three rescues were disembarked in Porto Empedocle.

November 3 After an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Aurora** rescued 35 people from a rubber dinghy. Survivors were disembarked in Lampedusa.

November 5 **Seabird 1** spotted a rubber boat with 71 people and alerted authorities. **Nadir** was able to respond and rescue the people, bringing them to Lampedusa.

November 6 In the morning, 53 people became trapped on the supply vessel MARIDIVE. Seabird 1 was on scene and alerted relevant authorities, who ignored calls and refused help. **Trottamar III** was nearby and could render assistance after more than 48 hours of failed attempts to coordinate with state actors. Survivors were brought to Lampedusa, several were in poor medical condition after days stranded at sea.

November 7 After an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Aurora** rescued 31 people from a rubber boat. Survivors were brought to Lampedusa after waiting for hours in the cold and bad weather for a POS (place of safety).

November 8 **Nadir** issued a Mayday Relay for a fiberglass boat at severe risk of capsizing. The boat had previously been alerted by Alarm Phone. All 47 survivors were embarked onto the rescue vessel after conditions continued to deteriorate and safely disembarked in Lampedusa.

November 11 Following a Frontex Eagle1 Mayday Relay, **Nadir** assisted 29 people in distress from a dangerously overcrowded rubber boat. Due to the urgent need for medical attention, all were immediately taken aboard the Nadir vessel. Tunisian authorities arrived but departed after a brief exchange. Lampedusa was assigned POS.

November 12 **Mare Jonio** was placed under administrative detention under the Piantedosi decree, which imposed a 60-day detention and fine of 10,000 euros.

November 14 After an alert by **Alarm Phone** and Mayday Relay by Frontex Eagle1, MSF rescue vessel **Oyvon** and **Louise Michel** coordinated to rescue 41 people who had spent 3 days at sea. Survivors were brought to Lampedusa.

November 16 Following an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Louise Michel** and **Oyvon** searched for a rubber boat in distress with 27 people. Oyvon was able to find and rescue the people, bringing them to Lampedusa.

November 17 **SeaPunk 1** responded to an **Alarm Phone** alert for a boat in Tunisian waters. The search continued into the night and Alarm Phone, after having lost contact with the boat, was able to re-establish contact and receive an updated position, leading to the successful finding of the distress vessel. 31 survivors were embarked onto the ship after being at sea for four days. Lampedusa was assigned as POS.

November 18 **Louise Michel** rescued 50 people from a small rubber boat after an alert by **Alarm Phone**. Porto Empedocle was assigned for disembarkation.

November 23 After a distress call from **Alarm Phone**, **Humanity 1** rescued 75 people from an overcrowded wooden boat. Survivors, many suffering from hypothermia, seasickness and exhaustion, were safely disembarked in Lampedusa after they were transhipped on a patrol boat belonging to the Italian coast guards.

November 26 **Humanity 1** spotted and rescued 85 people from a double-decker wooden boat and was assigned Ortona as POS.

DECEMBER 2025

December 1 Upon disembarkation of the 85 survivors, **Humanity 1** was placed under detention by Italian authorities under the Piantedosi decree, who accused crew from failing to coordinate with Libyan authorities. **AlarmPhone** alerted a distress case of 26 people aboard a rubber dinghy. **Aita Mari** responded and was able to recover all 26. Distant port of Civitavecchia was assigned, forcing survivors to endure more unnecessary days at sea, despite the rescue occurring southwest of Lampedusa in the Maltese SAR. While patrolling, **Louise Michel** reported aggressive behavior from the Libyan coast guards.

December 2 After hearing a Mayday Relay from an unknown station, **Life Support** was able to locate and rescue a rubber dinghy with 46 people at 3am in the Libyan SAR. The boat was at risk of capsizing in the 1.5 meter waves. The distress case was matched with an alert sent by **Alarm Phone**. While searching for another Alarm Phone case, Life Support found a second overcrowded rubber boat with 73 people. After rescuing the second vessel, the distant port of Bari was assigned by Italian authorities, requiring an additional 3 unnecessary days at sea for survivors.

December 9 Following an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Aurora** rescued 48 people from a rubber dinghy. Survivors were disembarked in Sicily.

December 11 Following a Mayday Relay by Frontex Sparrow2, **Sea Watch 5** arrived on scene and rendered assistance to 34 people on a rubber boat.

December 12 **Sea Watch 5** spotted a second distress vessel with 67 people. The overcrowded boat was rescued in the night. The distant port of La Spezia was assigned, requiring four days of navigation, causing further unnecessary stress to both crew and survivors. **Aita Mari** informed authorities of an iron boat with 56 people, including 7 babies. After rescuing the boat, an infant required a medevacuation by the Italian Coast Guard. The rest of the survivors were assigned the distant port of Brindisi.


Louise Michel overheard a Mayday Relay via an unknown station for a distress vessel and arrived on scene to assist the 25 people aboard a rubber dinghy. The Libyan Coast Guard was also on scene and instructed the ship to complete the rescue. Following this first rescue, she ship found a second boat after an **Alarm Phone** alert, this time with 61 people aboard a rubber boat. After completing the second rescue deep in the night, the distant port of Reggio Calabria was assigned.

December 13 **Alarm Phone** alerted on a case in the middle of the night. **Life Support** responded and was able to find the fiberglass boat with 69 people in Libyan SAR. The distant port of Naples was assigned as POS. Following an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Aurora** arrived on scene and rescued 42 people from a rubber boat. All survivors were disembarked in Siracusa.

December 14 After many alerts by **Alarm Phone**, **Seabird 3** located and also informed relevant authorities of the distress case with 44 people on a fiberglass boat. An unknown station issued a Mayday Relay and luckily **Life Support** was able to rescue the boat, more than 12 hours after the initial alert in the Maltese SAR. Survivors had departed Benghazi and were forced to spend several more days at sea due to assignment of Naples as the POS.

December 24 **Alarm Phone** sent an alert for a boat with 33 people. **Solidaire** responded and was able to rescue the people, disembarking survivors in the distant port of Savona.

December 26 After an alert by **Alarm Phone**, 33 people ended up stranded on the Miskar platform before being taken aboard Maridive 703, where they remained stranded for 5 days. Authorities repeatedly failed to render assistance or coordinate with rescue NGOs. The people were finally rescued by **Ocean Viking** and brought to the distant port of Savona. Full details provided on pages 8-9)

 + Suivre
MV Louise Michel
@louisemichelcrew.bsky.social
Yesterday, a patrol boat of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard closely approached the Louise Michel and fired shots into the water at just 200-300 metres away. Shortly after the incident, our crew found an empty rubber boat - the sad evidence of what we assume to be an illegal pull back to #Libya.



1st of December

EU-funded Libyan patrol boat fires shots close to Louise Michel

Today, a patrol boat of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard closely approached the Louise Michel and fired shots into the water at just 200-300 metres away. Shortly after the incident, our crew found an empty rubber boat - the sad evidence of what we assume to be an illegal pull back to Libya.

This continued aggressive behaviour by the Libyan organisation is not only known of, but seems to be encouraged by Europe as part of its brutal border regime.

Italy and the EU train, arm, and legitimise Libyan groups to enforce their illegal border violence. The specific vessel that shots were fired from today was gifted to Libya in 2023, with a ceremony that Italian Foreign Minister Tajani, Interior Minister Piantedosi, and EU Commissioner Várhelyi were present at.

MVLOUISEMICHEL

MVLOUISEMICHEL

END OF DECEMBER - FIVE DAYS OF RESISTANCE AT SEA!

For five days, 34 people stood up to a violent border regime and fought for their fundamental right to freedom of movement. They were rescued in the Maltese search and rescue region by the Maridive 703, an offshore supply vessel servicing the oil and gas industry, but were then deliberately abandoned by so-called 'safe' states. They were left at sea to endure days of political neglect and institutional cruelty while resisting an illegal pullback by the Tunisian coast guard.

Throughout these days of confrontation and survival, their resistance was not isolated. Civil society mobilised, raised the alarm, and applied pressure, exposing the hypocrisy and brutality of European border policies that allow people to drift at sea as a deterrent.

After five days of struggle and collective resistance, the border regime lost the fight. The SOS Méditerranée ship Ocean Viking finally rescued the group and brought them to safety. This rescue was not an act of charity; it was a victory wrested from a system designed to exhaust, punish and make people disappear.


26/12/2025

15:05 AlarmPhone informs the Italian and Maltese authorities about a group in distress at sea near the Miskar oil platform. Shortly afterwards, the 34-people group, including three children and three women, are taken on board the MV Maridive 703. The rescue took place in the Maltese Search and Rescue Region (SRR), meaning that Malta and Europe are legally responsible for disembarking the group in a place of safety. The group also explicitly states that they want to be brought to Europe.

15:20 Shortly after, the rescue ship Solidaire requests authorization from the Italian MRCC to divert from their current course and bring the survivors to a Place of Safety.

27/12/2025

20:08 Alarmphone receives the information that the Tunisian Coast Guard came to the Maridive ship to pull back the people towards Tunisia (which is not a safe country). The pullback failed, allegedly because of bad weather.



28/12/2025

10:26 AlarmPhone sends another email to urge the authorities to let the people disembark in Europe, as their safety cannot be guaranteed in Tunisia. In the following hours, AlarmPhone calls several times the Italian and Maltese authorities but no-one assumes responsibility.

18:48 AlarmPhone receives information that some people are in a critical health situation.

22:22 Alarmphone tweets to urge Malta to act.



Sea-Watch International
@seawatch_intl

According to Alarmphone, 34 people, including three children, have been stranded on the offshore supply vessel Maridive 703 for four days now. They are facing an abduction to Tunisia. Europe, commit to international law and human rights! Take action now!

29/12/2025

17:17 AlarmPhone sends another email to authorities, urging them to take the people to Europe.

30/12/2025

09:45 Alarmphone sends an email update to authorities after learning about a second boat that was stranded close to the Miskar platform. Alarm phone later learnt that, contrary to our first information, this second group of people was not rescued by the Maridive, but was intercepted and pulled-back by the Tunisian coastguard.

12:20 Alarmphone sends an email update to authorities after learning that two people have died since they got rescued by the Maridive.

16:30 The NGO rescue ship Ocean Viking informs authorities of their ability to perform a rescue and asks for rescue coordination by the responsible RCC.


16:39 The NGO Solidaire sends another email to urge authorities to act.



@alarmphone
@alarm_phone

The crew of the Maridive has rescued a second boat in distress, which means that a total of 108 people are stranded on #Maridive703! Two people have reportedly died and several are injured. We call on #Malta and #Italy to end this inhumane situation and finally let them land!!

[Traduire le post](#)



12:23 PM · 30 déc. 2025 · 8 325 vues



Sea-Watch International
@seawatch_intl

108 people are stranded on the Maridive 703. Two died and many are injured. They must be brought to a port of safety immediately and receive medical care. Lives are at risk and delays kill!

[Traduire le post](#)



31/12/2025

Ocean Viking finally completes the transshipment of the people and proceeds to bring the group back to a safe port of disembarkation. Alarm phone learnt at that moment, from survivors, that the group of survivors actively resisted the pullback from Tunisian coastguard.

In the end the group consisted of only 33 people: Alarm phone does not know whether this discrepancy with our first information of 34 people, is due to a disappeared person or to wrong information.

Five days of struggle
and collective
resistance!




SOS MEDITERRANEE
@SOSMedIntl


1/2 Today, #OceanViking evacuated 33 ppl rescued by #Maridrive703 in the overlapping Maltese-Tunisian SRR, incl. 3 women (1 pregnant) & 3 children. A few are medical cases after a week at sea. Survivors report another group was pushedback to #Tunisia.

JANUARY 2026

- January 3** After a Mayday Relay by Frontex Eagl1 and alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Solidaire** was able to find and rescue 36 people from a rubber dinghy. Merchant Vessel Bailey Tide was on scene and assisted in the rescue. Sadly, one person was reported missing. The rest were disembarked in La Spezia.
- January 13** Following an alert by Alarm **Phone**, **Solidaire** was able to find a boat with 26 people. The distant port of Ancona was assigned as POS, requiring 5 additional days of sailing for the crew and survivors.
- January 15** In the evening, the **Alarm Phone** alerted on a case with 44 people aboard an unseaworthy fiberglass vessel. After several updates from Alarm Phone, Merchant Vessel Sider confirmed rescuing the people and awaited further coordination from relevant authorities. **Ocean Viking** responded being able to transship the people. Under coordination of Italian authorities, Ocean Viking embarked the survivors, several of whom required immediate medical care. Palermo was assigned POS requiring several more days at sea for the survivors.
- January 16** After an alert by **Alarm Phone**, **Ocean Viking** spots and rescues 40 people from an overcrowded rubber boat. OV continued sailing for previously assigned POS Palermo.
- January 24** **Sea Watch 5** spotted and rescued a boat with 18 people. Catania was assigned POS.

 **SOS MEDITERRANEE**
@SOSMedIntl

1/4 Following an alert from @alarm_phone, the #OceanViking today evacuated 44 people from the merchant vessel SIDER in the Maltese SRR, many in critical medical condition. Our teams activated a mass casualty response plan.




0:46

6:43 PM · Jan 17, 2026 · 3,891 Views

 **SOS MEDITERRANEE** @SOSMedIntl · Jan 17

2/4 All survivors are now safe on board and receiving medical care. They report leaving #Benghazi at least two days earlier on an unseaworthy fiberglass boat. They were rescued Thursday night by the merchant vessel, north of Benghazi in the Maltese SRR.

 **SOS MEDITERRANEE** @SOSMedIntl · Jan 17

3/4 Their crew gave food & water but weren't equipped for 44 people. Mayday calls to authorities went ignored. #OceanViking, initially heading to #Palermo to disembark 46 people, was authorized by #IMRCC to delay arrival and requested to coordinate with the competent authority.

LEGAL FRAGMENT

THE ICC'S FIRST LIBYA TRIAL: WILL CRIMES AGAINST PEOPLE ON THE MOVE BE INCLUDED?

On 1 December 2025, German authorities surrendered Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri (“Al-Buti”) to the International Criminal Court (ICC), marking the first transfer of a suspect to The Hague since the Libya Situation was referred to the Court in 2011. El Hishri, a senior figure within the Special Deterrence Force (SDF/Al-Radaa), was arrested in Berlin on 16 July 2025 pursuant to an ICC warrant. He is suspected of responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between 2015 and early 2020 at Mitiga prison in Tripoli, including murder, torture, sexual violence, persecution, and outrages upon personal dignity.

Charging decisions and potential exclusion of people on the move

With El Hishri now in ICC custody, the proceedings have entered a critical phase. The arrest warrant

issued on 10 July 2025 reflects a narrow interpretation of the contextual elements of crimes against humanity. This limitation originated partly from the Prosecution’s own application, which defined the “civilian population” affected by crimes at Mitiga as individuals perceived to oppose SDF/Al-Radaa or its ideology, although it argued that crimes against migrants were sufficiently linked to the attack.

The Pre-Trial Chamber adopted and further restricted this framing, excluding “sub-Saharan African” detainees on the basis that their detention was linked to their migrant status. Most strikingly, while the Chamber acknowledged that the evidentiary material disclosed indicia amounting to enslavement of migrant detainees, this conduct was nonetheless placed outside the case’s contextual framework.



Picture: David Yambio (Refugees in Libya) holding a banner in front of the ICC headquarters- The Hague, Netherlands. 3 Dec 2025

The Prosecution challenged this reasoning, but the Appeals Chamber declined to review it on procedural grounds.

Between now and the end of March 2026, the Prosecutor has the opportunity to propose amendments to the charges. Whether crimes against people on the move will be included in the ICC's first Libya trial thus depends on whether the scope is expanded and accepted at the 19 May 2026 confirmation of charges hearing — a decisive moment given the Court's limited progress to date on crimes against people on the move in the Libya Situation.

Victim participation and state cooperation

Broadening the scope of charges is only part of ensuring justice. Meaningful victim participation will be central to ensuring the proceedings are fair and reflect the gravity of the crimes suffered. Accountability also depends on effective cooperation by Libyan authorities and ICC States Parties, as required by the Rome Statute and UN Security Council Resolution 1970. Yet successive Libyan authorities in both eastern and western Libya have failed to cooperate with the Court, allowing those suspected of criminal responsibility to continue operating with impunity.

Germany's transfer of El Hishri demonstrates how cooperation with the ICC should function, even as its public position regarding the enforcement of certain other ICC arrest warrants stands in tension with this example. By contrast, Italy's failure to surrender Osama Elmasry Njeem following his arrest on an ICC warrant in January 2025 undermined accountability and reinforced impunity. Rejecting Italy's reliance on domestic law and national security arguments, the ICC found Italy in breach of its Rome Statute obligations in October 2025 and, in January 2026, referred Italy's non-compliance to the ICC Assembly of States Parties.

El Hishri's surrender to the ICC is an important step toward justice, truth, and reparation. But it will only mark a genuine turning point if the proceedings recognize the full range of crimes alleged against El Hishri in Mitiga, including those targeting people on the move and Libyan victims, and if all States uphold their cooperation obligations consistently.

Allison West, Senior Legal Advisor at ECCHR

Website: <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/>

AGRIGENTO COURT: NGOs CANNOT BE SANCTIONED FOR NOT COMMUNICATING WITH THE LIBYANS

With the order of 3 December 2025, the Court of Agrigento suspended the administrative detention of the sailing boat TROTAMAR III, belonging to CompassCollective, a network of activists engaged in supporting search and rescue activities for shipwrecked people in the central Mediterranean, stating that failure to communicate with the Libyan authorities is not provided for by law as a reason for sanction and therefore cannot justify either fines or administrative detention.

The TROTAMAR III and its captain had been accused of not immediately communicating the rescue operations to the Coordination Centre responsible for maritime rescue in the area where the event took place (the Libyan one), having communicated the rescue exclusively to the Maltese and Italian authorities.

This action – which was necessary due to the well-known violence of the Libyan authorities and their

collusion with human traffickers, as well as the failure to respect basic human rights in Libya – resulted in the administrative detention of the vessel and the imposition of an administrative penalty on the captain and the shipowner.

In the order in question, the Court of Agrigento specifies that, given the essentially criminal nature of the penalty imposed and, in any case, on the basis of the law, priority must be given to “*the principle of the specificity and certainty of the offence and the principle of the prohibition of analogical interpretation*”.

This means that penalties can theoretically only be imposed in the event of a violation of “one of the conditions” referred to in Piantadosi decree law.

These conditions do not expressly include failure to promptly notify the rescue operations to the Coordination Centre responsible for maritime rescue

in whose area of responsibility they took place, and therefore such omission cannot be penalised.

The importance of this ruling, which is strictly anchored to precise and correct regulatory parameters and general principles of law, lies in reinforcing the conviction that failure to communicate with Libyan authorities by vessels of the so-called civil fleet cannot be subject to sanctions. This circumstance has already been recognised by other courts and courts of appeal on the basis of the finding that the Libyan authorities cannot be defined as credible actors in the search and rescue system and, in any case, Libya cannot be considered a safe place of disembarkation for shipwrecked persons, migrants and asylum seekers.

The decision of the Court of Agrigento is one of many decisions reported by ASGI over the last two years,

which demonstrate the illegality of the administrative practices applying the so-called Piantedosi decree against NGOs and of that legislation itself.

ASGI continues to call for the activities of organisations engaged in search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean not to be criminalised, for the administrative authorities not to apply rules that reduce the operational capacity of sea rescue operations, and for the repeal of all legislation on this matter that has been recently enacted by the current Italian government.

Asgi, 22 December 2025

Press release in Italian: <https://www.asgi.it/asilo-e-protezione-internazionale/tribunale-di-agrigento-non-si-possono-sanzionare-le-ong-perche-non-comunicano-con-i-libici/>



Illustration: [compass-collective.org](https://www.compass-collective.org)

ANALYSIS

NEW EUROPEAN PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM: REFLECTIONS A FEW MONTHS BEFORE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE

The new European Pact on Migration and Asylum is scheduled to enter into force on 12 June 2026. The package, adopted by the Parliament and the Council on 14 May 2024, consists of 10 new legislative acts, including 9 regulations and 1 directive, which overall seem aimed at further hindering the chances of those arriving in Europe to access asylum and gain the right to stay.

This brief contribution offers some reflections on these changes and their potential impact, a few months before their entry into force.

While on the one hand the Pact stands in continuity with the path set out in the 2015 EU Agenda on Migration and the “hotspot approach”, on the other hand it attempts to radically intervene in the current European legislative framework, introducing new mechanisms for rendering invisible, marginalizing and excluding people on the move.

Against those who manage to overcome externalisation policies

The issue of managing the EU's external borders through the redefinition of migration and asylum policies has been at the centre of political debate for years. The climate of discussion appears increasingly hostile to people on the move, and calls for the containment of mobility, with a view to “defending” the EU's external borders, are unequivocally dominant. Over the years, externalisation policies have become increasingly structured, with a view to preventing departures by sea, increasing the level of border surveillance and violence, to the detriment of the human rights of those attempting to cross them.

In this context, the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum represents yet another tool for control and exclusion, as well as a potential violation of the fundamental rights of those who risk their lives to exercise the freedom of movement that governments would like to structurally preclude.

The provisions that the Pact introduces – covering a wide range of issues, from screening procedures at the border to access to asylum, from reception policies to return ones – represent the other side of

the coin of increasingly harsh border externalisation policies. In other words, they concern those who manage to escape the illegitimate, violent and potentially lethal external border surveillance infrastructures – with a view to preventing departures.

In this project, the European Union plays a key role, not only in terms of planning hostile scenarios for those arriving in Europe informally, but also in terms of implementing the new provisions. The pact chooses to adopt nine regulations, which are more binding instruments for States, leaving them less discretion. The only “directive”, which is less binding than regulations, is that on “reception”, which is therefore dedicated to those already considered “worthy” of remaining in the territory.

The main goals of the Pact seem to be those of radically weakening the right to asylum, as the only – and last – resort to obtain the right to remain for those informally reaching the EU, and facilitating the expulsion of those who are not considered worthy of any kind of international protection. Among the many instruments introduced by the Pact to undermine the right to asylum there is the redefinition and strategic use of the notion of “safety” – applicable to countries of origin and transit. While people coming from Safe Countries of Origin (SCOs) would be hindered in their asylum applications, those who do manage to apply would go through accelerated border procedures that are exceptional and drastically reduce legal guarantees for a fair trial: against the multiplication of reasons to channel asylum seekers into border, accelerated and exceptional procedures, ordinary access pathways to asylum would become a residual opportunity.

Furthermore, through the definition of Safe Third Countries (STCs) and “return hubs”, the Pact seeks to expand the possibilities of “getting rid” of as many asylum seekers as possible, considering their applications “manifestly unfounded” and allowing for their “forced transfer” to these hubs, which are considered competent to examine applications for international protection.

Those who arrive by sea, for example, first face a screening process, followed by border checks, and certainly situations of detention – de facto or de jure – as far as possible, from the point of view of the States, aimed at repatriation or forced transfer to third countries.

On the invisibility and marginalisation of those arriving in Europe: border procedures and the fiction of non-entry

One of the central elements of the Pact is a radical shift in border procedures for those arriving in Italy by sea.

Some of the instruments introduced are fully in line with the Hotspot Approach and with all those informal and illegitimate practices that civil society has observed over the years in Sicily and in the landing regions. The new “screening regulation” formalises the practice of the “information sheet” (foglio notizie) – as a tool for collecting summary information on arriving persons as part of identification procedures.

Although renamed the “screening form” (modulo consuntivo), the regulation provides nothing more than a tool for categorising and selecting arriving persons, based on the collection of personal details, nationality and the reasons that led the person to come to Europe informally, risking their life.

Over the years, civil society has repeatedly highlighted the injustice underlying this tool, which collected information obtained in lack of sufficient legal information provision, aggravated by the conditions of de facto detention, in which people's contact with the outside world was severely limited. The lack of knowledge of their rights on the part of people who had just arrived in Italy often led to their unfair channeling into detention procedures aimed at repatriation, based on their nationality.

To the frontierisation of “screening” procedures, which still tends to marginalise those arriving in Europe and render them invisible, the pact adds further administrative procedures, in which the power relationship between migrants and the authorities appears increasingly unbalanced. While, on the one hand, the reform of databases means that police authorities can access all sources of data on foreign nationals, regardless of any specific interest or mandate, on the other hand, the person concerned does not seem to have the right to know all the information that states have about them.

This places them in a subordinate position and risks undermining their right to defence, in a scenario of increased surveillance and hyper-control.

Finally, while on the one hand the Pact takes a further step towards moving screening, asylum access and detention procedures aimed at repatriation “to the border”, on the other hand it formalises one of the most controversial institutions we have seen in Italy in recent years, namely “the fiction of non-entry”. In practice, despite their physical presence on the territory, States have the power to deny them the “right of access” to it, pretending that the person is not present. This “denial” of presence on the territory – as a scenario in which screening procedures, access to asylum and detention for the purpose of return are implemented – only further “blurs” the boundaries of the law, restricting the guarantees due to those who cross EU borders informally.

The “missing” discourse on deprivation of personal liberty: what guarantees?

A combined reading of the various rules introduced by the pact shows that the formal detention of persons who have arrived in Europe informally should be – at least on paper – considered a last resort, reserved for specific categories of persons considered “dangerous” to public order and national security or “at risk of absconding”. Yet the provisions contained in the screening regulation and the procedures regulation are based on the assumption that the person concerned must be anytime “available” to the public authorities.

While it is difficult to imagine what measures states will put in place to ensure this “immobility” without formal detention orders validated by judicial authorities – as for those detained in preremoval centres (CPRs) - Italian experience teaches us that there are many possible forms of “de facto detention”, that people can experience: these forms of confinement have often taken place on border islands, such as Lampedusa or Pantelleria, due to the impossibility for people arriving by sea to leave them independently, without interacting with the police.

In the above-mentioned hotspots, the denial of contact between people who had just arrived in Europe and the outside world, coupled with the tight deadlines of the accelerated border procedures for examining asylum applications, were capable of seriously undermining not only the right to asylum, but also access to the right to defence.

Furthermore, according to the new Pact, even “persons with specific needs”, so-called vulnerable persons, including unaccompanied minors, may be deprived of their personal liberty. This is despite the fact that the procedure for determining vulnerability is poorly defined in the substance – especially with regard to who should carry it out and how – but hyper-defined in terms of timing – and therefore possibly “not to be reassessed” after a specific period of time, unless the doctor deems it necessary. This is also despite the well-known structural complexity of identifying the special needs of people arriving by sea and the need for potentially long periods of time for certain categories to emerge, such as victims of trafficking and labour exploitation, people with mental health issues, or survivors of torture and intentional violence, as well as sexual and gender-based violence.

Beyond the geographical characteristics and the type of infrastructure that will be used for this purpose – for example, the Italian state should make 8,010 places available for border procedures – an essential element of “deterrence” from escape or secondary mobility seems to be the “threat” entailed by some of the provisions included in the Pact. On the one hand, it places heavy responsibilities and duties on asylum seekers – such as “remaining at the disposal of the

authorities”, being cooperative, “answering the questions asked by the Territorial Commission in a ‘satisfactory’ manner”; on the other hand, “non-compliance” requires a “punishment” for the person: for example, in the case of asylum seekers, failure to comply with their duties would result in an “implicit rejection” of their asylum application. If the person then wished to reapply, this would be categorised as a “reiterated application”, which would not be examined on its merits, implying a drastic reduction of legal guarantees for the applicants.

On the presumed ‘safety’ of countries of origin and transit as a tool of exclusion

The most worrying element introduced by the Pact is perhaps the re-definition of “safety” notion, through a restrictive approach. The new procedure Regulation states the possibility of considering countries to be safe even though there are exceptions in terms of groups of people or parts of the territory. In other words, the Pact attempts to overcome the notion of safe countries of origin (SCO) as reiterated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in several decisions, most recently in the Alace and Canpelli joined cases (see the text in Echoes No. 19), as a condition to be verified constantly and generally in each territory, without exceptions. This would allow

Picture: Borderline Europe



many more countries to be considered safe than in the past, in a scenario in which, coming from a country considered safe is a criterion for channeling asylum seekers into accelerated procedures at the border, which are significantly less protective than ordinary procedures. A further criterion for channeling into such procedures is whether the asylum seeker comes from a country for which the rate of recognition of international protection is less than or equal to 20%. While this threshold must be calculated based on Eurostat data, it is unclear whether reference should be made to first-instance decisions – i.e. those taken by the territorial commissions for the recognition of status – or second-instance decisions, i.e. those taken by the courts on appeal.

The purpose of these instruments seems clear: limiting as much as possible access to forms of international protection and therefore the right to remain in the EU. This would be achieved through the increasingly widespread use of exceptional asylum procedures and the reconfiguration of ordinary asylum procedures in residual terms.

The question of “safety” determination of a non-European country is at the heart of another important issue, namely the possibility for States receiving asylum applications to declare them “inadmissible” or “manifestly unfounded” when there is a possibility of transferring the person to a country considered to be a “country of first asylum” or a safe third country.

These novelties seem inspired by the procedures introduced by the EU-Turkey deal, and allowing the transfer of asylum seekers reaching Greece back to Turkey, as well as to the (temporarily failed) Italy-Albania deal.

How to still support those who exercise the right to leave by claiming freedom of movement?

If the legal battle that began in Italy in 2023 over the accelerated border procedures introduced by the controversial “Cutro Decree” led to the emptying of detention facilities for asylum seekers in Sicily and the failure of the Italy-Albania agreement, the introduction of the new pact risks reversing these outcomes. It attempts to bypass the legal progress made both by the jurisprudence in Italy and at the European Court of Justice.

Less than six months before the Pact entry into force, Europe seems eager to implement some of its main

new features. On 10 February 2026, the Parliament voted by a large majority on a list of “safe countries” - applicable to both countries of origin and third countries - and adopted changes to the EU asylum procedure regulations, to enable faster processing of asylum requests. While these agreements still need to be formally adopted by the EU council, Italy issued yet another “security decree”, aimed at fostering their implementation.

Until now, European law has been the basis for strategic litigation aimed at guaranteeing asylum seekers a set of rights and respect for the principle of non-refoulement, but with the entry into force of the pact, some of these rights will cease to exist. Conversely, the changes introduced risk providing fertile ground for the implementation of measures proposed by states in violation of European law, with the aim of hindering departures and managing arrivals in a restrictive manner.

For this reason, it appears necessary and urgent for civil society to reflect on what tools can still be used to combat a political agenda aimed at making those who arrive in Europe informally invisible, marginalised and excluded. While, on the one hand, it is appropriate to identify new possible references for strategic litigation, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights or constitutional law, on the other hand, it seems important to identify the tools available to solidarity networks to counter the new violations that the Pact would make possible.

Today more than ever, building relationships with people who are formally or informally detained, with a view to providing them necessary information and facilitating their access to legal assistance, but also making them visible and amplifying their voices, seems an essential tool in challenging border regimes and the new procedures envisaged in the Pact, which are based, in any case, on the invisibility, marginalisation, isolation and silencing of people arriving by sea.

Reflecting on the tools to combat the legal and political drift that the Pact represents is now an essential precondition for destabilising border regimes. Communicating, across walls, with people who are de facto and de jure detained, are necessary practices today, with a view to supporting infrastructures for freedom of movement.

Chiara Denaro, Sicily Monitoring project

BIOMETRIC EXPERIMENTS AND ARBITRARY PRACTICES TARGETING PEOPLE ON THE MOVE

Lampedusa. Picture: Maldusa



Over the past month, Lampedusa has become a testing ground for the introduction of new screening and border management tools, most notably the new "Screening Toolbox" package made available by the Frontex Agency. The pilot, which lasted from October 13th to 24th 2025 at the Lampedusa hotspot and was carried out by Frontex in collaboration with EUAA and EUROPOL staff, is aimed at operationalising new screening and border procedures in preparation for the implementation of the highly criticised new EU Pact on Asylum and Migration, which entered into force in January 2026 and will spread effects from June 12th, 2026.

As reported in a [previous article](#) and in line with the so-called Screening Regulation, screening of migrants consists of preliminary health and vulnerability checks, provision of information, biometric data collection, and registration in EURODAC, identification and security checks, including consultation of EU border management systems, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Entry-Exit System (EES), and the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS). Essentially, the

package translates into the collection and entry of sensitive data into database systems shared on a large scale among Schengen area countries, legitimizing a series of obscure yet standardized procedures in Lampedusa that could constitute ongoing privacy violations.

Unlawful practices also include arbitrary confiscation of phones and passports upon arrival at the dock. Additional risks associated with feeding such a large amount of data are the creation of bottlenecks in IT systems. Concrete examples are the unlawful rejection of legitimate asylum applications due to software flaws, bugs, and cases of identical names between migrants and their families[1]. For example, a Cameroonian woman staying at a CAS in Puglia last month witnessed the loss of her personal data from the Schengen information system (SIS), which prevented her from lodging an international protection application.

Therefore, the new "Screening Toolbox" package, within the broader framework of policies for the criminalization, detention, rejection, and deportation of migrants and asylum seekers—promoted and

validated by the European Union—is a cog in the wheel of accelerated border procedures that, taken together, contribute to the erosion and suspension of several fundamental rights, above all the right to asylum and international protection. Experts claim that the effects caused by the introduction of these measures might entail, among other issues, lowering the procedural guarantees, as well as the increased likelihood of administrative detention in detention centers and other detention facilities scattered throughout Italy, and an increase in repatriations[2].

This festering system is characterized by systemic procedural opacities, where violations of the right to asylum, privacy, and the best interest of the child become daily practice. We witness this coming to daylight when Frontex conducts repeated interrogations of unaccompanied minors once disembarked at Molo Favalaro [3].

The Agency continues to operate in a gray area of law, insinuating itself into the wounds of the rule of law by virtue of a now permanent systemic exceptionality, where it is no longer possible to distinguish between violence and legitimacy, within a process of continuous compression of fundamental human rights to the detriment of those of people on the move. It forcefully re-emerges that violence and policies of subjugation are not a deviation from the system, but rather constitute one of its structural products, articulated through the border dispositifs of the nation-state, where the distinction between what is to be protected and what is to be "criminalized" responds solely to political interests.

In this dehumanizing scenario, the logic of rearmament and growing militarization becomes dominant and forcefully re-emerges on multiple levels and with varying intensities in the central Mediterranean. While they are impacting bodies, imaginations, and places—primarily in border zones, be they at sea, in the air, or on land—every shipwreck (the latest occurring just a few days before Christmas, costing the lives of 116 people[4]) increasingly takes on the character of a state massacre.

The criminalization of ship captains becomes a sacrificial act aimed at exonerating the responsibilities of criminal, falsely moralistic, and hypocritical European policies. Instead, the "Screening Tool box" operates as a biometric attack on people on the move, deepening the violence of the border regime and normalizing the suspension of rights through the logic of permanent exceptionality as a mode of governance.

The European Union continues to promote border control and management mechanisms in which rights are classified on a racial basis, de facto tied to the country of origin. It also invests billions of euros in negotiations to externalize borders with non-European countries deemed "safe." In this context, on December 8, the Council of Europe approved a new common system for repatriations, further extending the applicability of the concept of a safe country.

Once again, we continue to monitor what is happening in the central Mediterranean, denouncing the EU's border regimes and what is happening in Lampedusa.

Once again, we are working to disseminate counterinformation and provide a comprehensive vision based on solidarity, human rights, and support for people on the move, because migration is not a crime!

Maldusa

[1] The dangers associated with the use of biometric data for these purposes have been the subject of analysis and criticism by the European Agency for Fundamental Rights for years: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/under-watchful-eyes-biometrics-eu-it-systems-and-fundamental-rights>

[2] See [ECRE's analysis](#)

[3] These are so-called "debriefing interviews", a practice that has no legal basis and has been repeatedly censored by EU bodies. See the [decision](#) of the European Data Protection Supervisor as well as [the one](#) of the European Ombudsman.

[4] On December 19, off the coast of Tunisia, a deadly shipwreck occurred that claimed the lives of 116 people, leaving only one survivor. Following the alert raised by the NGO Alarm Phone, the Italian Coast Guard confirmed receipt of the report but nevertheless terminated the communication without providing any further feedback, while the Libyan Coast Guard stated that it had not carried out any rescue or interception operations on the 18th or 19th of December.

WEBSITE - <https://www.maldusa.org/l/biometric-experiments-and-arbitrary-practices-on-people-on-the-move/>

CRIMINALISATION

“SARA MARDINI - SEAN BINDER” CASE: A HUGE VICTORY IN A TRIAL THAT SHOULD NEVER HAVE EXISTED IN THE FIRST PLACE

Finally, after 8 years the case is over! On 15 January 2026, the Court of Mytilene on Lesbos island unanimously declared all the defendants innocent of all charges, with judges and prosecutors in full agreement.



Gathering of people in solidarity and the defendants outside the court after the victory.

The trial was referred to as the largest case of criminalisation of solidarity in Europe, involving 37 initial defendants, 24 of whom were identified. Five of them were held in pre-trial detention for over 100 days, including Sarah Mardini, Sean Binder, and Nassos Karakitsos. The defendants were 24 members of international humanitarian organizations (rescuers, volunteers, and activists) who were helping refugees on Lesbos between 2016 and 2018.

All of them faced sentences of up to 25 years in prison on felony charges, including migrant smuggling, membership in a criminal organisation, money laundering, and fraud. Last year, they were acquitted of the misdemeanour charge of espionage.

The truth is that their only “mistake” was that they saved the “wrong” lives — the lives of those whom Europe labels as “illegals,” and “invaders,” effectively calling for their erasure. Inside the court, the judges felt awkward. Within the first 5 minutes, they realised there was no case. The file was empty. There was not a single piece of evidence linking the defendants to the alleged crimes.

Is it possible that eight (!) years were wasted on something the judges understood in the first five minutes? Is it possible that an indictment file that was empty was sent to court? How did this pass the investigative stage? Why was it not dismissed earlier?

Those who constructed this case must be held accountable. Twenty-four rescuers had to wait eight years to prove that WhatsApp is not an “encrypted illegal application used for smuggling people,” but rather a necessary tool for organising frontline emergency responses on Lesbos and coordinating the thousands of volunteers active on the ground. Twenty-four rescuers had to wait eight years to prove that using binoculars to scan the sea for boats in distress is not “spying” or “intercepting state secrets” (the number and type of the Greek CG vessels and Frontex).

As Sean Binder said: “It took eight years to prove that when Sara Mardini fundraised for a washing machine, she didn’t mean money laundering (!), but was making a legal call for donations to support refugee aid groups. It took eight years to clarify that conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations is not smuggling. We shouldn’t have had to wait 8 years for that. It should have taken 30 minutes for a police commander to speak to the coastguard officer and verify the facts. During those eight years, people drowned in the Greek islands, thousands of euros were wasted, the solidarity movement was defamed, and rescue NGOs left Greece.

Now that all the defendants have been acquitted, will the mainstream media outlets that ran headlines like “NGO-smuggler ring busted on Lesbos” apologize? Probably not. Had there been convictions, it would have been a huge story.

That is why this victory has enormous political significance. It is a victory against the deep state and against the mechanism that legitimises violence at the borders and criminalises not only the people on the move, but also anyone who helps the people on the move. The truth is relentless. Despite their efforts, no rescuer has so far been convicted—neither in Greece nor in Italy. The only people who have been convicted for migrant smuggling in Greece are border police officers.

Once again it has been proven that the fairy tales they spin about NGOs as spies, anti-Greek agents, or Turks are meant only for domestic consumption and media noise. Apart from rallying a conservative audience, these prosecutions have another fundamental goal. The purpose of these prosecutions is not to convict. The purpose of these prosecutions is to terrorise, discredit, and erase solidarity from European borders.

The purpose of these prosecutions is to intimidate and kick volunteers and aid workers off the shores of Lesvos, to get rid of witnesses, so the Greek government can seamlessly keep on doing barbaric pushbacks and actions of border brutality against the people on the move.

According to data from the organisation "Aegean Boat Report", from 2020 to 2025 the Greek authorities carried out 3,559 pushbacks in the Aegean,

forcibly returning 97,240 people. None of the perpetrators has been arrested to date. Unfortunately, they have succeeded. There is currently no rescue boat on the island.

However, this victory is not the end, but a first step towards justice. We are happy about the acquittal, but we must continue the struggle so that the real criminals of the European borders are punished. We must continue the fight for the thousands of people who face the same charges and are inside European prisons "as smugglers," while in reality they are random refugees. Solidarity will prevail!

If helping people is a crime, then we're all guilty.

Iasonas Apostolopoulos,

Witness of Defense, SAR activist

7 YEARS EL HIBLU3: HOW MANY YEARS DOES IT TAKE TO BREAK A CHILD?

On 28 March 2026, seven years will have passed since Abdalla, Amara and Kader arrived in Malta. When they stepped onto the island in 2019, they were 19, 15 and 16 years old. Teenagers. Two still legally children. Today, they are young men in their twenties. And they are still waiting for their trial to begin.

What can happen in seven years?

A child can become an adult. A teenager can finish school, fall in love, choose a profession. A young athlete can train from amateur to elite. A start-up can grow into a billion-dollar company. Technology can transform the world twice over.

Seven years is the length of adolescence. Seven years is long enough for a personality to form, for a future to take shape. For the ElHiblu3, seven years have unfolded inside a courtroom calendar. This case is not just a legal process. It is a case about time and endurance, and what prolonged criminalisation does to young people.

The El Hiblu Incident – over 2500 days ago

On 27 March 2019, 100 people were rescued at sea by the tanker *El Hiblu 1*. The ship attempted to return the survivors to Libya, the very place they had fled. Those on board protested. They begged and demanded not to be sent back to a place where they knew to expect torture and death.

Abdalla, Amara and Kader helped translate and mediate between the scared travellers and the scared crew. Eventually, the tanker steered North towards Malta.

When the ship entered the islands' territorial waters in the early hours of 28 March, Malta's Armed Forces stormed it. No violent resistance was found. Still, the three teenagers were arrested and charged with several crimes, among them terrorism.

They were placed in a high-security prison wing for adults for 2 weeks before they got transferred.

After seven months in detention, Abdalla, Amara and Kader were released on bail. But, bail is not freedom. For seven years now, their lives have had no certainty about tomorrow. When you are 22 and still bound by charges first filed as a child, development does not simply pause, it warps.

Research on adolescence is unequivocal: identity formation, autonomy, risk-taking, education, and social bonding are central during these years. Chronic uncertainty and criminal labelling alter life trajectories. Even without conviction, the stigma of terrorism charges is socially corrosive.

Instead of building careers and lives, they build defence strategies. Instead of planning futures, they await procedural updates. Justice delayed is not neutral. It accumulates consequences.

Legal Limbo as Punishment

Even without a verdict, the process itself becomes a sentence. The question inevitably arises: what function does this prolonged prosecution serve? When young people are kept in prolonged uncertainty, the consequences are invisible but profound: chronic anxiety about the future, interrupted education, restricted mobility, limited prospects, social stigma, delayed independence...

Time, at that age, is not neutral. It shapes who you become. And while they wait, life elsewhere moves forward.

When Abdalla, Amara and Kader left Libya, they carried the ordinary ambitions of young people everywhere: safety, work, maybe study, maybe football, maybe something entirely different.

What they did not expect was to spend their formative years under the threat of life imprisonment.

The European border regime did not just intercept them at sea. It intercepted their adolescence.

And yet, they have not broken. They work. They show up. They endure. They build community.

Seven years have passed. Abdalla, Amara and Kader are now in their twenties, they remain suspended between accusation and resolution. Seven years is

not an administrative delay. It is the length of an adolescence. It is the time in which a person becomes who they are.

Justice delayed is not neutral. It reshapes lives. How long can a prosecution be stretched before the procedure itself becomes punitive? Childhood shall not be something a legal system quietly swallows.

As the anniversary approaches again, the demand remains simple:

Translation is not a crime.

Survival is not hijacking.

Preventing an illegal pushback to Libya is not terrorism.

Free the El Hiblu 3!

On 28 March, the transnational campaign calls for actions. Join us in the mobilisation and be strong and loud together. Reach out to get involved via mail@elhiblu3.info and amplify our voice on socials @elhiblu3

El Hiblu 3 campaign



7 YEARS OF EL HIBLU 3: STRUGGLE & ALLYSHIP

21 YEARS OF STOLEN YOUTH

+ 60 SCHEDULED HEARINGS

over **2500 days** in legal limbo

FORCED TO DISAPPEAR

AT THE EDGE OF THE SEA: CHRONICLES OF DEATH AND DISAPPEARANCE

This section documents the shipwrecks, deaths, and disappearances along the Central Mediterranean Route. These tragedies are the result of an EU policy, and can be prevented if safe passage was available to the millions who want or are forced to move. This list does not include all the shipwrecks that occurred in the Central Mediterranean, since many could have disappeared in invisible shipwrecks or through other forms of state violence. We stand with their families, friends, and communities in the demand for truth and justice.

One is too many.

NOVEMBER 2025

- 3rd of November 42 people missing off the coast of Libya. Only 7 survived out of 49 people. The people were left at sea for 5 days. The Rubber boat capsized near the Al Buri Oil Field after departing from Zuwarah early morning ([Mediterranea Saving Humans](#), [OIM](#))
- 7th of November On the 6th of November, Alarm Phone alerted authorities to a sinking boat off Tunisia. According to the Tunisian Coast Guard, 59 people are alive and with at least 3 people missing, among them children ([Alarm Phone](#))
- 11th of November In the afternoon of November 11, Maha (37), Haydar (12) and Zayn (13) lost their lives when a boat with refugees coming from Libya capsized while a Frontex vessel approached them 15 nm south of Crete. While 55 survivors were rescued, a total of six people have been found dead from that shipwreck. Three people were found on the same day, two more on November 18, when they were seen floating in the sea by passengers of a merchant ship, and another on November 20, when he was found on Grammenos beach in Paleochora ([Alarm Phone](#))
- 15th of November At least four Bangladeshi migrants are reported to have died after two boats, carrying around 95 migrants, capsized off the Libyan coast November 15 ([Press](#))

DECEMBER 2025

- 5th of December Five people who lost their lives on their way from Tunisia to Italy. 45 people survived and were taken by the Italian Coast Guards to Lampedusa. ([Alarm Phone](#), [Press](#))
- 6th of December 18 people died and only 2 people survived a shipwreck south of Crete. An inflatable dinghy carrying 20 people was found half-submerged 26 nautical miles southwest of Chrysi (Chrissi) island. ([ABR](#))
- 13th of December On the 12th of December, Alarm Phone learned that the boat they were alerted to had capsized off Sicily. 61 survivors were brought to Malta, some are in hospital, 1 person died. Alarm Phone never had contact with the boat but was told it carried 72 people. ([Alarm Phone](#), [Press](#))
- 19th of December A Shipwreck of a boat carrying about 117 people, in the central Mediterranean .The fate of the people remains unknown and families are still searching for the truth. The sole survivor of the tragedy was rescued by a Tunisian fisherman. ([Alarm Phone](#), [Press](#))
- 29th of December 108 people are stranded on the Maridive 703. Two people lost their lives and many were injured. ([Sea-Watch](#))

JANUARY 2026

15th Of January

12 people are missing after departing from Annaba, Algeria. They have spent at least 5 days at sea according to the testimony of one survivor. The survivors recall being rescued by a Passengers vessel heading towards Portugal ([Testimony of survivor](#))

22nd of January

À 18:40 CET, 61 survivors arrived at Favalaro Pier. Departed from Tunisia on an iron boat, they have been taken onboard the Italian patrol boat CP 322, 50 nautical miles from Lampedusa, after being struck by Cyclone Harry—the most violent cyclone to hit the central Mediterranean in the 21st century. A mother lost her two one year old twins at sea. One person from Mali lost his life, while being transported from the Pier to the hospital ([Maldusa](#))

25th of January

Authorities confirmed that one survivor was rescued to Malta. According to him, 50 people did not survive. The people started from Tunisia and spent 24 hours in the water. 49 people remain missing ([Alarm Phone](#))

28th of January

The teams of the Ocean Viking recovered the body of a woman in the Maltese Search and Rescue Region. They report that at least 380 people are feared to have drowned in the Central Mediterranean the previous week as Cyclone Harry struck the region. ([SOS Méditerranée](#))

30th of January

According to the recent reconstruction by Refugees In Libya, which is in direct contact with civil society in Libya and Tunisia, the number of people missing during Cyclone Harry is not 380, but over 1,000.

Formally, no authority has confirmed that number but at least 380 people were officially listed as missing as of 24 January. ([Refugees In Libya](#), [Sea-Watch](#))



CommemorAction at the cemetery, January 2026 – Lampedusa. Picture : Maldusa

REPORTS

NEW ALARME PHONE SAHARA REPORT: MORE THAN 34,000 PEOPLE DEPORTED FROM ALGERIA TO NIGER



Individuals deported and abandoned in the desert, Assamaka, 20 July 2025 (Picture: Alarme Phone Sahara)

After a wave of mass deportations attracted the attention of the Nigerien and international media in April 2025, deportation convoys from Algeria to the desert on the Niger border, near the village of Assamaka, continued throughout 2025.

The Alarm Phone Sahara team in Assamaka documented at least 34,236 people deported from Algeria in official and unofficial convoys between January and December 2025.

At the same time, it is certain that the actual number far exceeds the documented figures, given that in several cases, local structures were unable to record the number of people taken away in these convoys.

The conditions in which people are deported by the Algerian police and gendarmerie remain precarious and painful. This is especially true for people dropped off in the desert at Point Zero, 15 km from Assamaka, by ‘unofficial’ convoys, but also for Nigerien citizens, most of whom are loaded onto ‘official’ deportation convoys.

The Algerian security forces spare no one. Regularly, many women and children, often even babies, are among those deported. Sometimes this even affects people with disabilities, such as the blind. Many people arrive with injuries and trauma inflicted by the security forces.


The collaboration between Maghreb countries in the fight against people on the move, encouraged by EU Member States, and the chain deportations from Tunisia and Algeria are one of the reasons why, in 2024 and 2025, even more people were put on deportation convoys than in previous years.

The Alarme Phone Sahara team provides practical and tireless solidarity on the ground: they travel by tricycle to Point Zero to pick up weakened and injured people who have been abandoned in the desert. They provide them with first aid in the form of water and food kits. They take them to the infirmary....“

REPORT

<https://alarmephonesahara.info/en/news/assamaka-niger-more-than-34-000-people-deported-from-algeria-to-niger-in-2025>

MALTA MIGRATION ARCHIVE: NEW DATA CONFIRMS ANOTHER DEADLY YEAR



In December 2025, we published new data on our [interactive map](#): 242 distress cases that occurred between January and June 2025 in Malta’s search and rescue (SAR) zone. The data reveals a continued practice of non-assistance by the Maltese authorities, as well as a surge in forced pushbacks to Libya from within Malta’s SAR zone. The 242 cases involved more than 10,000 people – men, women and children – in distress in Maltese waters over a six-month period. Despite Malta’s legal and moral obligations, the authorities responded to only two of these distress cases, less than one percent. This is a wanton abdication of Malta’s duty to respond to people in distress in its SAR zone.

For the authorities in Malta, avoiding and delaying rescue has become normal practice. They have also refused to coordinate rescues with NGO and merchant vessels. These refusals are deadly: more people suffer and die at sea because of the Malta Government’s actions and inactions. In the first half of 2025, more than 580 people died in the Central Mediterranean, according to the OIM.

In parallel, our data reveals an unprecedented increase in pushbacks carried out by the so-called Libyan coast guard from within Malta’s SAR zone. Malta allowed the so-called Libyan coast guard into its SAR zone at least 16 times, comprising 6.6% of cases in the first half of 2025. This surge reflects more than double the number of pushbacks that occurred in the first half of 2024 and eight times the number in 2023. Pushbacks to Libya are illegal under international law. Malta’s responsibility to assist people in distress in their SAR zone and ensure they are disembarked in a place of safety is incontrovertible.

These 16 pushbacks from within Malta’s search and rescue zone involved 800 people forcibly returned to

‘unimaginable horrors’ in Libya, where migrants and refugees face systematic violence including unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, slavery and forced labour, extortion, and exploitation. In June 2025, the [discovery](#) of mass graves in Libya brought to light new gross human rights violations.

The Malta Migration Archive provides more extensive studies of eight cases (DC92–DC99) over the first half of 2025 to illustrate the realities of distress and pushbacks at sea. For example, on [4 February 2025](#), the civilian hotline Watch the Med – Alarm Phone received a call about 43 people in distress only 32 nautical miles south of Malta. Alarm Phone then lost contact with the boat and attempted to obtain information from Malta’s Rescue Coordination Centre for two days but got no response from the authorities. On 6 February, Alarm Phone received confirmation that the 43 people had been intercepted by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard within the Maltese SAR zone and forcibly returned to a prison in Zuwara, Libya. Forced pushbacks to Libya from so far within Malta’s SAR zone are unprecedented and an alarming escalation of Malta’s unconscionable practices at sea.

We are indebted to the CMRCC SARchive and the wider Civil Fleet for their tireless work in bringing to light the border violence and migration struggles in the Central Mediterranean and elsewhere. Without them, much of this border violence would remain invisible.

For more information on select cases in the second half of 2025 that do not yet appear on our map, please see our [news section](#).

Cetta Mainwaring, Malta migration Archive, 6 February 2026

AMPLIFYING VOICES

FEBRUARY 6, 2026, WORLD DAY AGAINST THE DEADLY BORDER REGIME

On 6 February, families, friends, and solidarity groups gathered to mark the World Day of Commemoration and Action, honouring people who have died or disappeared due to state violence along migration routes and within local communities.

The date recalls the events of 6 February 2014, when more than 200 people attempted to reach Tarajal beach in Ceuta from the Moroccan coast. Spanish Guardia Civil officers used anti-riot equipment to stop them from reaching shore while Moroccan forces looked on. Fifteen bodies were recovered on the Spanish side, dozens more disappeared, and survivors were returned, with additional deaths reported on the Moroccan side.

CommemorActions combine remembrance and protest, supporting families seeking truth, justice, and recognition for their loved ones. Each year, events are held worldwide to denounce deaths, disappearances, and trauma linked to migration policies and state violence.

Website - <https://commemoraction.net/>

Video-clip - (CommemorAction during the Transborder Sumer Camp in August 2025)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jWxy4XVGUhg>

COMMEMOR
february 6th



ACTION

2026

**Every life is worth
more than their
laws, their walls
and their weapons.**



Cities in which Commémor'Actions are organised in February 2026

Agadir, Athènes, Bamako, Bayonne, Berkane, Berlin, Bern, Blain, Briançon, Brest, Bruxelles, Caen, Cagliari, Calais, Ceuta, Cité Apix, Cologne, Conakry, Dakar, Douala, Douarnenez, Edea, Fès, Francfort, Freiburg, Gijón, Glasgow, Grand Bassam, Grenoble, Hambourg, Innsbruck, Laayoune, Leipzig, Le Havre, Londres, Madrid, Manchester, Mamou, Marseille, Martil, Mbao, Mbour, Messina, Milan, Morlaix, Nantes, Nador, Niamey, Nijmegen, Nouadhibou, Nouakchott, Oujda, Palermo, Palma de Mallorca, Paris, Parme, Portbou, Pikine, Rabat, Redon, Rennes, Roma, Saint-Étienne, Saint-Palais, Sokodé, Sofia, Taouyah, Tanger, Tétouan, Tripoli (Liban), Tunis, La Valette, Vienne.

Speech from Salahadine Juma (*Refugees in Libya*)

“Ladies and gentlemen, friends, allies, sisters and brothers,

We gather here today in Paris not only to commemorate, but also to bear witness.

We stand together to remember lives that were lost, voices that were silenced, and journeys that were never allowed to reach safety.

I speak today as a member of Refugees in Libya organization, but also as someone who carries stories that cannot be erased by borders, detention centers, or the sea.

Libya is not just a place on the map.

For thousands of refugees and migrants, it has become a place of fear, a place where human dignity is routinely denied. Men, women, and children are detained, abused, sold, exploited, and forgotten. Many never make it out alive. Many disappear without names, without graves, without justice.

Today, we remember them.

We remember those who died in detention centers.

Those who drowned in the Mediterranean while searching for safety.

Those whose only “crime” was to hope for a life free from violence, poverty, or persecution.

Commemoration is not only about the past.

It is also about responsibility our responsibility today.

Europe cannot continue to look away.

Outsourcing borders must not mean outsourcing humanity.

Policies that trap people in places of suffering must be named for what they are: violations of human rights.

As refugees, we are often spoken about, but rarely listened to.

So let me say this clearly:

We do not ask for pity.

We ask for dignity.

We ask for protection.

We ask for safe and legal pathways.

And we ask that our lives be valued equally.

Paris is a city of human rights, of revolution, of solidarity. Standing here today carries meaning. It reminds us that change is possible when people refuse to stay silent.

To our allies and supporters: thank you for standing with us. Your presence matters more than you know.

To policymakers who may hear our voices today: remember that history will judge the choices you make now.

And to those we commemorate: we promise you this you are not forgotten.

We carry your memory with us.

And we will continue to speak, to resist, and to demand justice until no one is forced to suffer in silence, and no life is treated as disposable.

Thank you.”









Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast



MOBILISATION

SEVEN HOURS FOR SEVEN YEARS: FREEDOM FOR THE EL HIBLU 3



Call for solidarity with El Hiblu 3!

28 March 2026 in Valletta, Malta

09:00 to 16:00 CET (place tbc)

Join us for a seven-hour vigil with a press conference, speeches, street-theatre, music, info-table, banners and more to protest against seven years of ongoing criminalization against three human rights defenders.

On 28th of March 2019 Abdalla, Amara and Kader arrived in Malta, having been rescued from a sinking rubber boat in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. At just 15, 16 and 19 years old, their dream of arriving in Europe had come to pass, yet a new nightmare was just beginning.

On 28th of March 2026, it will be 2,555 days since the El Hiblu 3 arrived in Malta and since they have been criminalised, unjustly accused of having committed multiple crimes, including acts of terrorism, threatening a crew, and hijacking a ship, charges that could carry life sentences.

With this protest, we will continue to show our solidarity with the three young men, whom we awarded a human rights defenders prize for the bravery they showed as mediators and translators when facing the threat of an illegal pushback to Libya.

During our seven-hour vigil, we will condemn the ongoing injustice against the El Hiblu 3 and mark every hour, and thus every year, with a different activity focused on:

- Criminalization of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe;
- Illegal push backs, particularly in the Central Mediterranean;
- EU externalization policies with a particular view on the deals with Libya and Tunisia;
- Increasing deportations from Malta and other EU countries;
- Campaigns against racism and social exclusion in Malta;
- The civil fleet and its work against a politics of abandonment and pushbacks;
- Transnational networking and resistance against the EU border regime.

Please save the date and contact us if you are interested in joining us and if you have additional ideas for the seven-hour protest. We will spread and publish a more detailed program in early March on our website.

Contact - eh3coalition@gmail.com

Website - <https://elhiblu3coalition.org/>



CONTACTS

Website - <https://civilmrcc.eu/>

Email - political-moderator@civilmrcc.eu

Echoes - civilmrcc.eu/echoes-from-the-central-mediterranean/

EDITING TEAM

Sophie-Anne Bisiaux
Arthur Charlety
Hagen Kopp
Marie Kleihauer